Strategic airlift: a casualty of deregulation by Gourdin, Kent N
Journal of Transportation Management
Volume 2 | Issue 1 Article 4
4-1-1990
Strategic airlift: a casualty of deregulation
Kent N. Gourdin
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/jotm
Part of the Operations and Supply Chain Management Commons, and the Transportation
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at DigitalCommons@WayneState. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Transportation Management by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@WayneState.
Recommended Citation
Gourdin, Kent N. (1990). Strategic airlift: a casualty of deregulation. Journal of Transportation Management, 2(1), 47-66. doi:
10.22237/jotm/638928180
STRATEGIC AIRLIFT: A CASUALTY OF DEREGULATION
by
Kent N. Gourdin
University of North Carolina at Charlotte
INTRODUCTION
In any society, logistics is the means for bridging the gap 
between the national economy and a planned military operation. 
However, in a democracy, logistics planning must compete with 
other national objectives for an equitable distribution of that soci­
ety's scarce resources. The share allocated to logistics must be 
effectively utilized to create and sustain military forces in support of 
National policies and objectives. Towards that goal, logistics is 
comprised of four principal processes: requirements determination, 
acquisition, distribution, and conservation. The suboptimization of 
one of these components can adversely effect the entire logistics 
function which would have severe consequences for the defense 
effort as a whole. In other words, it makes little sense to procure 
sophisticated equipment (acquisition), but lack the ability to expedi­
tiously move it to the front lines (distribution).1
This paper will focus on the transportation component of the 
distribution process, specifically addressing the contention that the 
U.S. commercial aviation sector is no longer capable of fulfilling its 
wartime mission. The implication is that, without a fully responsive 
contingency distribution system, the logistics element would be 
unable to support national defense objectives. Clearly, without 
logistics a sustained war cannot be fought, let alone won. In a broad 
sense, this article will examine the deteriorating linkage between 
civilian wartime transportation providers and users (the Department
Volume 2, Number I 47
of Defense). Specific areas to be addressed include military trans­
portation, strategic airlift, and several peripheral concerns of impor­
tance.
MILITARY TRANSPORTATION
Transportation has historically been recognized as a critical 
factor in the success (or failure) of military campaigns. During the 
War of 1812, the United States incurred enormous costs associated 
with transporting men and material, due to inadequate facilities and 
transportation routes. In fact, the almost universal opinion at the 
time was that those facilities could have been built for what it cost to 
cope without them.2 Sokol notes that, once the situation has 
become stabilized, the logistics problem, primarily one of transporta­
tion, becomes of primary concern.3 Similarly, General Douglas 
McArthur realized the importance of establishing and maintaining a 
viable logistical chain, stating that tactics can be decisively influenced 
by the means at hand for maneuvering, supplying, and controlling 
combat forces.4
Rather than investing in, and maintaining, transport resources 
necessary only for war, the U.S. policy has been to rely on the 
nation's commercial transportation industries to make their person­
nel and equipment available to the DOD should the need arise. This 
is in contrast to the Soviet Union, which maintains military airlift and 
sealift assets beyond those required to meet peacetime needs. The 
transport aircraft carry the livery of Aeroflot, the national airline, 
while the ships fly the flag of the merchant marine, but they are, in 
actuality, intended to satisfy contingency transport needs. In fact, 
our government has repeatedly turned to the civilian sector for its 
contingency transportation needs. Early in American history, the 
military practice was to contract with civilians for the provision of 
support functions such as transportation.5 With the outbreak of 
World War I, the nation found itself with a private rail network 
unable to meet wartime transport demands. In order to win that
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FIGURE 1. Air Transportation Policy Formulation & Implementation
conflict, the federal government took over the railroads in 1917 and 
ran the system until 1920.6 This linkage between defense and 
commercial transportation interests continues to exist today, and 
forms the foundation for much of our total wartime movement 
capability.
An important characteristic of this relationship is that the 
government has exerted very little influence over the equipment 
developed for, and operated by, transport companies. Rather, the 
DOD "makes do" with planes, ships, and vehicles operated by firms 
whose profit-driven needs may be significantly different from those 
of defense planners. As an example, two mechanized air cargo 
handling systems have evolved over the years, one developed by the 
military and one by the civilian air carriers. The two are partially, 
though not totally, compatible, a situation that could be extremely 
limiting in a contingency. However, a larger and more serious 
problem arises when the needs of the carriers no longer coincide 
with those of national defense. For example, one of the initial 
results of airline deregulation was that carriers began operating 
smaller airplanes over shorter routes, often replacing larger aircraft 
with these new fuel efficient aircraft. Unfortunately, these new 
planes were of little use to the DOD, which still required large, long- 
range aircraft. We will return to this commonality question later.
The formal institutional relationship between national security 
and air transportation goals is depicted in figure 1. Haefele notes 
that it is national purpose--as articulated and expanded in national 
goals--that determines the structure of supporting policies.7 Thus, 
the various cabinet Secretaries are concerned with establishing 
policies and objectives within their respective departments that will 
contribute to the attainment of the overall national objectives as 
specified by the President. However, the specification of national 
security goals also influences the development of transportation 
goals insofar as the nation's transport is expected to support the 
DOD. This may be, unfortunately, a one-way street While national 
transportation policy includes a commitment to meet the needs of
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national defense, defense policy is often developed with little regard 
for the availability of adequate transport resources. The result is that 
the transportation system must often react to, rather than evolve 
with, DOD policy since it is not until national transportation policy is 
implemented that the specific needs of one sector relative to the 
other are actively considered. The intended objective should be to 
utilize the nation's transportation resources so as to meet the needs 
of both. However, the actual results may be quite different, as the 
following example will readily illustrate.
Design on the Army's new Ml tank was begun in 1973. The full 
production run called for 7,058 vehicles to be manufactured at a 
unit cost of $2.68 million. It was not until mid-1981 that the Army 
rigorously addressed the transport problems inherent in the move­
ment of the 60 ton behemoth. The Pentagon noted that a standard 
rail car could only handle one Ml, so the proposed solution was to 
build 569 stronger, more expensive flatcars that could accommodate 
2 tanks each.8 Similarly, air transportation is constrained in that the 
C5 wide-body airlifter can only carry one vehicle, effectively limiting 
the weapon's usefulness as a part of a short-notice deployment
STRATEGIC AIRLIFT
The entire concept of strategic airlift (i.e. between the United 
States and overseas areas) was formulated with the start of World 
War II.9 Since the military had little long-range air transport experi­
ence, the domestic airline community was pressed into service to fill 
the void. Though operating under the auspices of the Army's Air 
Transport Command and the Naval Air Transport Service, the 
carriers used their own equipment, facilities, and personnel to 
provide the capability for long-haul, rapid movement of men and 
equipment so desperately needed. In essence, the airlines them­
selves built and operated the wartime strategic airlift organizations. 
Following the war, the Air Force's Military Air Transport Service 
(MATS) became the permanent strategic air movement arm of the
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United States military establishment. In 1965, MATS became the 
Military Airlift Command (MAC), which continues to perform as the 
single DOD manager for airlift. Strategic air movement is provided 
with an organic fleet of 96 C-5 wide-body aircraft, and 267 narrow- 
body C141 s.10
To augment this capability in time of war or national emergency, 
the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Program was created in 1951, 
whereby civilian air carrier aircraft were identified by tail number 
and allocated for national defense at three levels of need which will 
be explained in detail later.11 There was, and still is, no legislative 
basis for the CRAF; its success depends upon the cooperation of the 
airline industry.12 To foster that spirit of voluntary participation, as 
well as to familiarize civil carriers with the handling of military 
passengers and cargo, MAC awards yearly contracts to CRAF partici­
pants for the provision of international air services. For Fiscal Year 
(FY) 89, $310 million worth of airlift will be provided for MAC by 
commercial carriers,13 The CRAF as of August 1989 is depicted in 
Table 1. (It is worth noting that the exact size and composition of 
the CRAF fluctuates from month to month as carriers add and drop 
aircraft due to maintenance, sales, or equipment acquisitions.) By 
far the largest and most important portion of the CRAF is the Long- 
Range International Segment, consisting of 400 aircraft. This is the 
element that supports MAC strategic operations, and necessitates the 
use of aircraft capable of extended overwater operations with a 
productive payload.
Participation in the CRAF involves a commitment on the part of 
the carriers to respond to varying emergency situations incremen­
tally, based on three levels of urgency. Stage I may be employed by 
the Commander-In-Chief of MAC (CINCMAC) to maintain cargo and 
passenger backlogs at MAC air bases within acceptable limits.
Carriers have 24 hours to make an aircraft available for missions.
- Stage II includes those airplanes in Stage I, and is for expanded airlift, 
approved for use by the Secretary of Defense in providing capability 
for a contingency not warranting a declaration of national emer-
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TABLE 2
CARRIERS PARTICIPATING IN THE CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET
As of August 1989
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(Source: MAC HQ Form 312, Monthly Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Capability 
Summary, 1 August 89
gency. As in Stage I, carriers have 24 hours to make an aircraft avail­
able. Stage III may be implemented by the Secretary of Defense, 
only after a national emergency is declared by the President or 
Congress. Carriers have 48 hours to respond to his call, which 
results in the commitment of all long-range cargo aircraft Even 
though Stage III utilizes all CRAF line-haul resources, it is still not 
sufficient to meet wartime air cargo requirements, a shortcoming 
that will be discussed in more detail later.14 Carriers participating in 
the CRAF as of August 1989 are shown in Table 2.
Presently, the U.S. wartime airlift requirement for military cargo 
is 66 million ton miles (MTM)/day, a figure that takes account of our 
sealift capability and - the prepositioning of equipment at various 
overseas locations. MAC organic aircraft (C-141/C-5) will provide 
32.7 MTM/day capability, while the KC-10 (an aerial tanker/transport 
based on the commercial DC-10) will generate an additional 4.5 
MTM/day of military airlift15 A Stage III CRAF activation would result 
in approximately 16 MTM/day capability, based on the CRAF compo­
sition in August 1989.16 Thus, out of the 66 million ton miles/day 
that must be moved in wartime, the U.S. can, at best, hope to 
support only 53 million ton miles/day in the foreseeable future, 
leaving a 13 million ton miles/day shortfall.
The shortage of required airlift was discussed earlier. Of critical 
importance is the fact that this shortfall is exacerbated by a CRAF 
now subject to the vagaries of the free market Deregulation of the 
airline industry led to a dramatic increase in air carrier competition. 
Coincidentally, costs (particularly for fuel) were rising while the 
nation's economy faltered and fewer people travelled by air. The 
airlines moved to adopt hub-and-spoke systems serviced by smaller 
aircraft; carriers like Pan Am, United, and American abandoned all­
cargo service and sold off their freighter aircraft; new carriers 
entered the industry, squeezing profits still further and, in some 
cases, failing quickly. Complicating the situation for our interna­
tional airlines was the fact that, while we had deregulated our 
commercial air industry, the rest of the world had not. Thus, U.S.
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airlines faced the added burden of having to compete with overseas 
carriers owned or largely controlled by their respective governments, 
and, in many cases, operated for reasons other than profit. The 
result was a decade of upheaval in the air carrier industry that 
directly impacted the Long-Range International segment of the CRAF 
as well. The smaller airplanes being adopted by the carriers were 
not suitable for long-haul overwater transportation, and, in fact, 
were replacing older aircraft that could fulfill that mission. Braniff 
International went bankrupt in 1981; Flying Tigers came perilously 
close to following suit in 1986; and Pan American, after losing $72.7 
million in 1988 (its 11 th moneylosing year out of the past 1 7),17 is 
now actively seeking some sort of merger partner.18
The 1980's saw other developments of importance to the CRAF. 
In 1983 the Air Force implemented the CRAF Enhancement Program 
whereby convertibility features could be retrofitted (at government 
expense) to existing passenger airplanes that would allow them to 
transport military cargo in time of war. Of the 19 B747s committed 
to the program, 15 have been modified as of late 1988.19 Another 
DOD effort to address the declining number of long-range airliners in 
the CRAF took the form of a joint venture (JV) Program initiated by 
MAC in 1986. The intent of the program was to bolster the CRAF by 
bringing in operators and/or carriers previously excluded from par­
ticipating. Should the need arise, aircraft and crews from the joint 
venture firms would be pooled and utilized as though they were 
being supplied by a single entity.20 This enabled MAC to utilize the 
significant cargo fleets of companies such as UPS and Emery, some­
thing it had not been able to do before. Finally, growing concern 
about the increasing age of the airliner fleet led foreign and domestic 
carriers to embark on an unprecedented aircraft buying spree.
Boeing received orders for 636 aircraft valued at $30.1 billion in 
1988,21 while McDonnell-Douglas logged $15.6 billion infirm 
backlogs for the year.22 Of importance to this discussion is the fact 
that included in those figures were firm orders for 1 72 B747-40023 
and 103 MD-11 wide-body transports.24
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However, whether or not the CRAF will benefit by these devel­
opments is uncertain. While the CRAF Enhancement Program 
resulted in the addition of valuable wartime cargo-carrying capabil­
ity, Pan Am was the only carrier willing to participate. Thus, there is 
no ongoing stream of existing aircraft being modified; in fact, the 
B747 lost over Scotland in December of 1988 was a CRAF enhanced 
plane. The airline was contemplating putting twelve more aircraft 
through the program, but the revenue capacity eliminated as a result 
of the accident may necessitate postponement of that decision.25 
Another area of concern centers around the wartime management 
of the CRAF and its various component parts. A full-scale activation 
would involve coordinating the efforts of 29 airlines and eight joint 
ventures. Of the seven long-range international segment joint 
ventures shown earlier in Table 2, three are made up of three 
carriers each, while two more are comprised of four and five carriers 
respectively. Notification procedures alone would to be daunting; 
while the task of providing ongoing leadership in a contingency 
environment would appear to be virtually impossible. Finally, the 
growth in wide-body aircraft orders is a mixed blessing. For the first 
time in over a decade, U.S. airlines are committing to wide-body 
long range jets in appreciable numbers. American Airlines, for 
instance, recently ordered eight MD-11s and optioned 42 more,26 
while Delta ordered nine and optioned 31,27 But these are all 
passenger versions that will provide no cargo carrying capability even 
if they do eventually find their way into the CRAF. Furthermore, tax 
law changes have combined with airline consolidations and mercu­
rial market conditions to force a shift in transport aircraft purchasing 
and ownership patterns. Carriers are finding short-term leases (i.e. 5 
years) an increasingly attractive alternative to ownership.28 In fact, 
30% of the U.S. commercial fleet is now leased, and that figure 
could increase to 60-70% in the next decade.29 This gives the 
airlines tremendous flexibility to change aircraft types in response to 
competition and market opportunities, and eliminates the large 
capital costs associated with purchasing their own aircraft. However, 
one of the largest leasing companies in the world is CPA Group Ltd, 
which is an Irish firm.30 This raises the specter of a further decline in
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the CRAF, since foreign-owned aircraft are excluded from participat­
ing. In addition, the flexibility inherent in the leasing option will 
work against the fleet stability so essential to the CRAF. Programs like 
CRAF Enhancement are predicated upon maintaining the modified 
aircraft in the U.S. fleet for considerably longer than five years.
The preceding discussion has served to illustrate a crucial fact: 
the needs of the airlines no longer parallel those of national defense. 
This is not, necessarily bad. However, there is no mechanism in 
place to insure the maintenance of that industry/government linkage 
forged during, and after, World War II. Indeed, we can't even 
“draft” the carriers as we did then because their emphasis on 
smaller aircraft makes that proposition of limited value. Thus, it is 
that missing link that is the crux of the problem. The Airline Deregu­
lation Act of 1978 makes essentially no mention of national defense, 
retaining the position underlying previous aviation legislation that a 
sound commercial air transport system would insure an adequate 
reserve of airlift capability in the event of war. Thus, it would be 
inaccurate to say that deregulation, in and of itself, placed the CRAF 
in jeopardy. Rather, the move away from economic regulation 
graphically illustrated that airline interests and defense transport 
interests may not, for whatever reason, coincide. The implication is, 
then, that in the absence of some mechanism to insure defense 
transport needs are met, managerial responses to future environ­
mental developments (advanced aircraft technology, noise and 
pollution concerns, further market changes) could prove just as 
detrimental to wartime airlift capability as deregulation has today.
Unfortunately, policy makers have not handled this divergence 
very well. The perception is that the best way for the government to 
foster support for the CRAF is within the confines of the free market, 
as opposed to some sorts of more direct action that will delineated 
later. Thus, after ten years of trying to negotiate the CRAF Enhance­
ment Program, the end result was the large-scale participation of 
only one carrier. Similarly, the almost inescapable conclusion is that 
the Joint Venture program would, if implemented, prove to be an
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administrative and logistical nightmare. Finally, after almost four 
decades, airline participation in the CRAF is still voluntary. In sum, 
MAC and the DOD seem content to react to environmental changes 
after they occur, rather than pushing for a more proactive approach 
that does not rely solely on the vagaries of the free market
PERIPHERAL ISSUES
It is important to realize that the use of civil air transport re­
sources for military purposes is, at best, a compromise. The C141 
and the C5 were specifically designed to carry cargo and are charac­
terized by a high wing design; that is, the fuselage is suspended from 
the wing. This places the cargo compartment close to the ground, 
and provides the drive on/drive off capability so essential to the mass 
movement of wheeled equipment. The civilian air cargo industry on 
the other hand uses aircraft that are derivatives of passenger planes. 
The B747, the DC10, the B707 and the DC8 were not designed for 
freight transportation. They have a low wing design which places 
the fuselage above the wing, effectively eliminating any possibility for 
drive on/drive off vehicle handling. In addition, the two systems 
each utilize cargo pallets that are fundamentally different in design. 
Those used by the military measure 88 inches by 108 inches, while 
civilian pallets are either 88 or 96 inches by 125 inches.
Shipping military cargo aboard civil airliners presents some 
unique problems, even in peacetime. Military aircraft and materials 
handling equipment (MHE) are designed to handle DOD pallets 
widthwise (i.e. the long edge is perpendicular to the aircraft's line of 
flight). Narrow body airliners, as well as the DC10, are loaded from 
the side, which means the pallets must first be placed into the CRAF 
airplane, then manually spun 90 degrees before they are pushed 
down the fuselage. On those B747s designed for loading through 
the nose, the pallets must enter the aircraft lengthwise (i.e. the long 
edge parallel to the line of flight). Hence, they all must be turned 90 
degrees before they are put onto the loader. When this is done,
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military loading vehicles can carry only four pallets versus the five for 
which they are designed. It is worth noting here that, while military 
pallets can be transported on civilian airplanes, commercial pallets 
and containers are virtually unusable on military aircraft. The rail 
and locking systems aboard civilian aircraft can be adjusted to 
accommodate both types of pallets, while military planes can only 
accept Air Force pallets. Unfortunately, when airliners are used to 
transport military cargo, suboptimal aircraft utilization can result 
from the smaller size and reduced load bearing strength of DOD 
pallets relative to airline pallets
Another problem is that extremely large pieces of cargo, 
particularly rolling stock, are very difficult to handle via civilian 
aircraft. When utilizing sideloading planes, they payload has to be 
small enough and/or maneuverable enough to make the 90 degree 
turn from the loader into the fuselage. In addition, the narrow cabin 
of the DC8 or the B707 effectively limits the size and shape of the 
shipment, as does the nose opening in the wide body. Finally, the 
lack of a drive-in/drive-off capability proves to be a very limiting 
factor, especially in the context of a wartime scenario. Of equal 
concern is that military and civil loaders are basically restricted to 
servicing their respective aircraft. That is, Air Force loading vehicles 
were designed to handle aircraft having a cargo floor essentially at 
truckbed height above the ground. While this equipment can also 
service narrow-body airliners, it, cannot interface directly with wide- 
body Freighters. An elevator of commercial design must be utilized 
as a bridge between the aircraft and the loader; the plane simply 
cannot be worked without it. Similarly, civilian loading equipment is 
intended for use on aircraft having a cargo compartment that is ten 
to fifteen feet above the ground. The cab is generally designed to fit 
under the fuselage, something the low-slung military transport 
aircraft does not allow.
The inescapable conclusion is that military and civilian cargo 
handling systems are fundamentally incompatible. The two function 
together in peacetime because there is sufficient time to overcome
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the constraints delineated earlier. But in a contingency situation 
those limitations could prove crippling. Essentially, military pallets 
and materials handling resources will be tasked to fulfill all wartime 
requirements because of the incompatibilities previously mentioned. 
Limitations on the type and size of cargo that can be moved aboard 
civilian aircraft would necessitate a horrendous scheduling effort 
intended to insure that aircraft and cargo are matched correctly.
The commercial elevator required for wide-body loading/unloading 
is an obvious weakness since those aircraft cannot be serviced 
without it Although MAC has prepositioned 116 of these elevators 
throughout the airlift system,31 there is no guarantee that commercial 
cargo missions will be, or can be, limited to those fields having an 
elevator on station. Finally, the lack of a drive-on/drive-off capability 
severely limits the effectiveness of civil airliners in a contingency 
situation.
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is absolutely imperative that the nation's air transport re­
sources become more responsive to the needs of national defense. 
One long range solution to the airlift problem would be for both 
MAC and the airlines to fly the same type of airplanes in the future. 
This could lower the per plane cost to each group, and would 
provide for a common cargo handling system while insuring a steady 
growth in usable CRAF capability. Of course, the introduction of the 
new C-17 widebody military transport (like the C-141 and C-5, also 
a high-wing design) in the mid 1990s will go a long way towards 
eliminating the airlift shortfall discussed earlier. But it will do 
nothing to address the deteriorating condition of the CRAF. Similarly, 
MAC has been working for years to put together a NATO "CRAF" 
comprised of suitable aircraft from nations belonging to that alliance, 
with little success. In truth, such a show of unity from countries of 
widely, disparate cultures and ideologies seems doubtful. Another, 
more immediate, alternative may be to capitalize on the renewed 
interest being shown by US airlines in wide-body planes, and CRAF
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enhance all long range passenger aircraft before they come off the 
assembly line. This would keep modification costs down, and would 
provide a flow of contingency capability into the civil fleet Admit­
tedly, the carriers might have some reservations about the effect of 
the increased weight on aircraft's productive range, but the impact 
of this could perhaps be minimized through some sort of abbrevi­
ated enhancement package that would limit the wartime cargo 
payload slightly in exchange for reduced structural strengthening.
From the standpoint of military airlift alone, the first solution 
delineated above is the preferred one since it dramatically increases 
not only capacity, but much needed drive-on/drive-off capability. 
Unfortunately, the cost of this option is tremendous, and it does little 
to address the ongoing health of the CRAF. Rather, the third alterna­
tive seems the smarter choice. By enhancing new civil aircraft, 
increased contingency airlift can be obtained at a reasonable per- 
plane cost. While these airplanes could not provide drive-on/drive- 
off flexibility of their military counterparts, perhaps bulky vehicles 
and other large cargo could be earmarked for MAC. Alternatively, 
funds could be spent to develop loading equipment that would 
allow roll-on/roll-off loading and unloading of civil aircraft At any 
rate, a continuous CRAF enhancement program sensitive to the 
revenue needs of the carriers, seems to offer the most promise for 
sustained CRAF growth.
CONCLUSIONS
Prior to 1978, the moods of the DOD tended to coincide nicely 
with those of the airlines. The latter wanted bigger, faster, longer- 
range aircraft, which was exactly what the former desired. The 
airlines could afford to buy those aircraft and were, by and large, 
perfectly willing to commit them to the CRAF. But while their 
collective enthusiasm for the CRAF remains just as strong today, the 
realities of the free market have made them less able to participate.
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MAC approached one large US carrier several years ago, requesting 
that several new B747s be CRAF enhanced while still on the assem­
bly line. The airline declined, citing range/payload penalties result­
ing from the weight of the modifications that would have rendered 
them less competitive over their long-haul routes. To put it bluntly, 
we simply do not have the means to rapidly transport the men and 
equipment needed to support DOD contingency plans. This, in turn, 
places the entire logistics effort at risk, a situation with grave implica­
tions for the nation's defense posture. Recall that the purpose of 
logistics is to create and sustain military forces to support national 
policy and objectives. Unless the relationship between the industrial 
providers and government users of air transportation is redefined to 
reflect the changing needs of both, America's strategic airlift capabil­
ity will become a casualty of deregulation. The loss of such an 
important national resource must not be allowed to happen.
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